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Abstract 
This paper argues that both openness and poverty in a country are endogenously 
determined by the country’s long-term economic development strategy. Development 
strategies can be broadly divided into two mutually exclusive groups: (i) the comparative 
advantage-defying (CAD) strategy, which attempts to encourage firms to deviate from the 
economy’s existing comparative advantages in their entry into an industry or choice of 
technology; and (ii) the comparative advantage-following (CAF) strategy, which attempts 
to facilitate the firms’ entry into an industry or choice of technology according to the 
economy’s existing comparative advantages.  
To carry out a CAD strategy, many governments of LDCs subsidize the firms in priority 
sectors by distorting capital prices, foreign exchange, and other inputs; and use 
administrative methods to allocate price-distorted inputs to the firms. The functions of 
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market will be suppressed. Rent-seeking will be widespread. As a result, economic 
performance will be poor and the income distribution issue will worsen. Foreign trade 
will also be retarded.  
Only if governments of less-developed countries make following their economy’s 
comparative advantage the basic principle for promoting the economy’s industrial 
development, will the economy have an open and well functioning market, maintain a 
high rate of capital accumulation, upgrade its endowment structure quickly, and see a 
more equitable distribution of income and fewer poor. 
Acronyms 
ADB  Asian Development Bank 
CAD  comparative advantage-defying strategy 
CAF comparative  advantage-following  strategy 
EXIM export and import dependent ratio 
FDI  foreign direct investment  
LDCs  least developed countries  
NSB  National Statistical Bureau of China 
SOEs state-owned  enterprises   
TCI  technological choice index  
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1 Introduction 
With disintegration of the colonial system in the 1950s, many newly independent 
countries have been striving to develop their economies and alleviate poverty. However, 
thus far, except for a few countries in East Asia, most have not realized these goals. 
Living standards in most of these countries have not improved substantially and for 
those in areas like Sub-Saharan Africa there has been almost no change. 
The trend of globalization in the last decades of the twentieth century has provided 
many opportunities and challenges for countries in the developing world. Though there 
is a great amount of interest in the relationship between globalization and poverty, a 
satisfactory analytical framework is lacking. Also, there is no consensus on the impact 
of globalization on poverty from the perspective of cross-country empirical studies. As 
Nissanke and Thorbecke (2005: 4) point out: 
Cross-country studies would require precise measurements and definition of 
the two key concepts: globalization and poverty. Yet, both concepts are 
multidimensional, and not easily captured in a composite index to be used in a 
meaningful manner in cross-country, comparative studies. Indeed, only 
detailed case studies are able to delineate the role of path dependence of 
multiple factors such as resource endowments, trade and production structures, 
policies, and institutions. Such research, if carefully conducted, should yield 
high dividends in identifying appropriate policy responses to globalization in 
relation to the overriding policy objective of poverty reduction. 
However, China’s experience1 after implementing reform and the open-door policy in 
1978 is an interesting case in the study of globalization and poverty. The average annual 
growth rate of GDP and trade reached 9.4 per cent and 16.0 per cent in 1979-2003, 
respectively (NSB 2004).2 According to current prices, the proportions of primary 
industry, secondary industry and tertiary industry as part of GDP, respectively, changed 
from 28.1 per cent, 48.2 per cent and 23.7 per cent in 1978 to 14.6 per cent, 52.2 per 
cent and 33.2 per cent in 2003. Similarly, the make-up of the employment structure in 
the same industries changed from 70.5 per cent, 17.3 per cent and 12.2 per cent in 1978 
to 49.1 per cent, 21.6 per cent and 29.3 per cent in 2003 (NSB 2004).3 The life 
expectancy of Chinese people also increased from 66.8 years in 1980 to 70.7 years in 
                                                 
1  China mentioned in this paper refers only to the Chinese mainland, and does not include Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan. 
2  Annual growth rate here refers to annual compound growth rate. 
3  Many people argue that share of tertiary industry is underestimated, but that of secondary industry is 
over-estimated.   2
2002 (World Bank 2004),4 while the rate of illiteracy decreased from 22.81 per cent in 
1982 to 6.72 per cent in 2000. In addition, the proportion of people with education 
above the high school level grew from 7.39 per cent in 1982 to 14.76 per cent in 2000 
(NSB 2004). 
In the study of globalization and poverty, the Chinese experience deserves special 
attention: with an average annual growth rate of 16.0 per cent, China’s foreign trade 
dependency ratio has increased dramatically since 1978; and China has also attracted a 
large amount of foreign direct investment (Tables 1 and 2). Poverty has been decreasing 
significantly. According to Ravallion and Chen (2004), in terms of both the official 
Chinese poverty line5 and the new poverty line established by the National Statistical 
Bureau (NSB),6 there is a significant reduction in the headcount index, poverty gap 
index, squared poverty gap index of rural areas, urban areas and the country as a whole 
(Table 3). The world development index (Table 4) also indicates that China has 
achieved great success in poverty reduction. However, despite these achievements, 
China has begun to face increasing income disparity and new kinds of poverty in recent 
years. It is important that a systematic analysis of China’s experiences in opening-up 
and poverty reduction be done, as well as lessons be drawn from its achievements and 
shortfalls. 
Table 1 
China’s foreign trade dependence ratio 
 Commodities  export Commodities  import 
  in billion US$  to GDP (%)  in billion US$  to GDP (%) 
Trade dependent 
ratio (%) 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)=(2)+(4) 
1978 9.75  4.62    10.89 5.17    9.79 
1980 18.12  6.00   20.02 6.61    12.61 
1985 27.35  9.02   42.25 14.03    23.05 
1990 62.09  16.10   53.35 13.88    29.98 
1995 148.78  21.29   132.08 18.89    40.18 
2000 249.20  23.06   225.09 20.83    43.89 
2003 438.228  30.95   412.76 29.16    60.11 
Source:   NSB (China Statistical Yearbook, various years).  
                                                 
4  Life expectancy in 2000 as reported by NSB (2004) was 71.4 years, higher than reported in the World 
Bank’s report. But generally speaking, it is a fact that the life expectancy of the Chinese people has 
increased greatly. 
5  The Chinese official poverty line is 300 yuan per person per year for rural areas based on 1990 prices; 
comparable poverty line for urban areas is not available. 
6   Based on 2002 prices, the new poverty line is 850 yuan per person per year for rural areas and 1200 
yuan for urban areas. Consumption bundle at this poverty line can guarantee the people’s daily need 
of 2100 calorie.    3
Table 2 
FDI and China’s investment 






1985  1.658  1.91   293.66  
1990  3.487  3.69   478.32  
1995  37.521  15.65   835.10  
2000  40.715  10.24   827.84  
2003  53.505  7.97   827.70  
Note:  *  Gross capital formation, which includes changes in inventories, is derived from Expenditure-
Approach National Accounting. 
Source:   NSB (China Statistic Yearbook, various years). 
Table 3 
Poverty in China (%), 1981-2001 
  Earlier poverty line    New poverty line 
 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
Rural 
Headcount index  28.62 9.85 11.66 4.20 4.75 64.67 23.50 29.72 13.82 12.49
Poverty gap index  6.84 1.92 2.84 1.13 0.81 19.99 5.99 8.52 3.55 3.32
Squared poverty 
gap index  2.35 0.52 1.17 0.58 0.19 8.44 2.16 3.43 1.50 1.21
              
Urban 
Headcount index  0.82 0.22 0.00 0.18 0.00 6.01 3.23 1.66 0.61 0.50
Poverty gap index  0.22 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.01 0.46 0.53 0.16 0.16
Squared poverty 
gap index  0.14 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.35 0.09 0.38 0.09 0.11
              
National 
Headcount index  23.02 7.49 8.52 2.97 2.96 52.84 18.53 22.16 9.79 7.97
Poverty gap index  5.51 1.45 2.08 0.81 0.51 16.17 4.63 6.37 2.52 2.13
Squared poverty 
gap index  1.90 0.40 0.85 0.42 0.12 6.81 1.65 2.61 1.07 0.80
Source:  Ravallion and Chen (2004). 
Table 4 
Headcount index of Chinese poverty, 1996-2001 
Index    1996 1998 2001 
Poverty gap index at $1 per day (%)   –  –  3.94 
Poverty gap index at $2 per day (%)   –  –  18.44 
Headcount index, national (% of population)   6.00  4.60  – 
Headcount index, rural (% of population)   7.90  4.60  – 
Headcount index, urban (% of population)   2.00  2.00  – 
Source:  World Bank (2004). 
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On the basis of previous studies (Lin, Cai and Li 1996; Lin 2003), this paper develops a 
general framework to analyse openness and poverty in developing countries7, followed 
by an empirical analysis of China’s experience. 
Our main arguments are as follows. The volume and structure of international trade, 
income distribution and poverty of a country are all endogenously determined by its 
economic development strategy. Countries adopting a comparative advantage-following 
(CAF) strategy will be more open, achieve rapid economic growth, and create more jobs 
for low-income groups, who rely mainly on physical labour for their livelihood. As a 
consequence, income distribution in these countries will be kept relatively even and 
poverty can be alleviated gradually. On the contrary, countries adopting a comparative 
advantage-defying (CAD) strategy to promote capital-intensive industries will 
inevitably see the opposite happen. This is because investment in the priority sectors of 
a CAD strategy creates limited job opportunities, excluding most poor labourers from 
formal labourmarkets. Moreover, firms in the priority sectors are nonviable in open, 
competitive markets. The survival of such firms depends on government subsidies and 
protection from international competition, and as a result, the economy becomes closed. 
As investment in priority sectors requires large amounts of capital, only the rich or those 
with good government connections have the ability to make the investments. The 
burden of providing subsidies to nonviable firms will ultimately be carried by those 
with less wealth and power. It will inevitably further distort income distribution and 
make it difficult to alleviate poverty. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: the following section 2 is a brief literature 
review. Section 3 provides a general framework for analysing the relationship between 
economic development strategy, openness and poverty. Section 4 discusses briefly 
China’s experience, while section 5 tests the hypothesis with China’s panel data. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2 Literature  review 
2.1  Globalization and poverty: theoretical and cross-country empirical studies 
The history of studies on globalization, economic development, income distribution and 
poverty is as long as that of economics itself. There is a huge amount of literature on 
these topics. Nissanke and Thorbecke (2005) have conducted an extensive literature 
review. According to their paper, economists have yet to reach a consensus on the 
relationship between openness, globalization and poverty. Economic growth and 
                                                 
7  Obviously, poverty problems exist not only in the developing countries, but also in the developed 
countries. But there is a big difference in the living conditions of the poverty-poor in the developing 
countries and developed countries. This paper focuses on globalization and poverty problems in the 
developing countries.   5
improving income distribution are essential steps toward alleviating poverty. At present, 
there are two opposing views on the impact of openness and trade on economic 
development and income distribution. Some economists believe that market opening 
and participation in globalization will contribute to economic development and improve 
income distribution, while other economists take the opposite position. 
The most recent empirical works fail to reach a conclusion on this issue. Milanovic 
(2002) and Easterly (2003) argue that the relationship between globalization and income 
distribution (then poverty) can be expressed as an inverted U curve. These conclusions 
may be useful in describing past phenomena, but have no implications for applicable 
policy on poverty reduction in the future. For instance, we can hardly make a suggestion 
on policy from Milanovic (2002), who states that economies with low-income should 
keep themselves away from openness in order to reduce poverty. Nor can we make the 
following policy suggestions according to the result of Easterly (2003), who suggests 
that economies with relative low openness should avoid further openness to prevent 
inequality in income distribution. 
Obviously, openness and trade are treated as exogenous variables in these analyses. But 
in our opinion, openness, income distribution and poverty are endogenous to a country’s 
development strategy, which is discussed in section 3. The effects of openness and 
globalization on poverty are determined by the following two factors: (i) the intrinsic 
characteristics of an economic structure before openness and (ii) a country’s approach to 
openness and globalization. For instance, should a country invest a large amount on the 
newest technologies or just purchase technologies that are suitable for its current 
economic needs? Will it develop necessary basic infrastructure or engage in risky R&D 
that requires a large number of foreign loans? Will it export products produced using 
relatively abundant domestic resources, or products produced using far scarcer 
resources that can only be obtained through government subsidies? 
2.2  Literature on poverty in China 
There have been many studies concerning China’s openness and poverty individually 
and in conjunction. Anderson, Huang and Ianchovichina (2004) analyse China’s rural 
economy and rural poverty after its accession to the WTO with a GTAP model and 
finds that cutting down agricultural import protections and removing agricultural 
subsidies will worsen the situation of rural residents who rely on an agriculture-based 
income, compared with that of urban residents. But if the Chinese government reduces 
the negative nominal protection rate of rice, meat, vegetables and fruit to zero after 
accession to the WTO, the decrease in wages for rural residents would be less. His 
analysis, on the other hand, emphasizes that the reduction of agricultural protections in 
developed countries would contribute to the reduction of rural poverty in China. The 
analysis divides rural households into three categories: category A includes households 
whose proportion of non-farm income was 0 per cent; categories B and C include 
households for whom the proportions were 30 per cent and 60 per cent, respectively. 
After accession to the WTO, the income of households in categories A and B decreased,   6
while for those in category C it increased. Of course, the elimination of negative 
agricultural protection would improve the situation of households in categories A and B. 
Chen (2004) finds that accession to the WTO would have little impact on average 
household income, household income inequity, and poverty in China, but the impact 
varies greatly among households with different characteristics. Generally speaking, the 
study finds that rural households would be harmed in the process, while urban 
households could benefit from it. The most vulnerable households are those who relied 
heavily on income from agriculture. Hertel, Zhai and Wang (2004) prove that after 
accession to the WTO if labour could move freely between the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, both rural households and urban households in the long run would 
benefit, though rural households would benefit less. However, in the short run, rural 
households would experience a small loss because of the restriction of labour mobility. 
Xue (2004) and Li (2004) analyse recent urban poverty problems in China and find that 
increasing numbers of laid-off and unemployed individuals, a result of enterprise 
reform, have increased urban poverty; the influx of migrants from rural areas is an 
important element of urban poverty; and poverty is also related to level of education and 
the health of residents. They suggest that increasing employment is a way to solve the 
problem of urban poverty.  
Li and Knight (2004) develop a new classification of poverty, based on the permanent 
income hypothesis. According to an individual’s current levels of income and 
consumption, poverty can be divided into three categories: permanent poverty, selective 
poverty and temporary poverty. Permanent poverty includes individuals whose current 
income and consumption are both below the poverty line. Temporary poverty refers to 
those whose current income is below the poverty line, but whose consumption level is 
above the poverty line because their permanent income is higher than their current 
income. Their current consumption is financed either by past savings or by new loans. 
Selective poverty refers to those people, whose current income is above the poverty line 
but consumption level is below the poverty line. Their choice to lower consumption is 
because they are either making up for past overconsumption or have expectations of 
making large expenditures in the future. According to their 1999 survey, Li and Knight 
(2004) discover that the overall urban poverty rate was 9.4 per cent in China, of which 
29 per cent could be categorized as permanent poverty, 20 per cent as temporary 
poverty, and the remaining 50 per cent as selective poverty.8 The propensity for high 
savings rates and low rates of expenditure of families categorized within selective-
poverty was because most of these families did not have members who were ill or 
children who were still in school, so their current expenditures were very low.  
Studies conducted by Ravallion and Chen (2004) can be taken as an authoritative 
analysis of Chinese poverty. They not only evaluate the change in the rate and extent of 
                                                 
8  When applying just the income standard or consumption standard, the poverty rate was 4.6 per cent 
and 7.5 per cent, respectively.   7
poverty since 1978, but also provide a theoretical explanation for it. According to the 
poverty line defined in their analysis, in the 20 years since 1981, the proportion of the 
Chinese population in a state of poverty decreased from 53 per cent to 8 per cent, but 
the speed of this decrease has slowed since the end of the 1990s. At the same time, the 
degree of inequity in China was found to be increasing, which the analysis pointed out 
has become a common focus in the study of economic development and poverty 
reduction. 
What’s more, another important finding of the study was that ‘the approach to economic 
development can affect poverty reduction’. Although we agree with this finding, we 
have reservations about their explanation for it, which is based in the idea that ‘if the 
overall growth rate of each industry9 remains constant since 1981, it will take 10 years 
rather than 20 years for incidences of poverty to decrease to 8 per cent’.10 The reason 
for our objection is simple: if the growth rate of secondary industry and tertiary industry 
remained at 1981 levels over the past 20 years (the growth of per capita income), then 
the demand for agricultural products would not have been as high as the actual levels 
that we have seen. In the extreme situation of a closed economy, since the demand 
elasticity of agricultural products with regard to both income and price is very low, an 
increase in agricultural production may result in a decrease, rather than increase, in 
farmers’ income. Although this paper correctly concludes that past reductions in 
China’s rural poverty was mainly due to agricultural growth, this can hardly be useful to 
suggest future policies for the reduction of rural poverty. Given the current endowment 
structure of population and land, depending on growth in agricultural output alone is 
hardly a sustainable method for reducing poverty. 
Although the views of the above literature may be different, they are all based on 
detailed econometric analysis and simulation. This paper does not intend to judge where 
a reasonable poverty line should be set or which measurement of poverty is more 
precise. What concerns us most is the construction of a general framework for analysing 
the relationship between poverty and openness. The literature on Chinese poverty 
mentioned above has thus far failed to do so.  
                                                 
9  The industries mentioned here refer to primary industry, secondary industry and tertiary industry. 
10 There is a methodology issue here. Just as Solow (2001: 283) points out when talking about cross-
country regressions of economic convergence, ‘the causality issue points to a deeper question: Do 
cross-country regressions define a meaningful surface along which countries can move back and forth 
at will?’   8
3  Economic development strategy, openness and poverty: a framework11 
Not including the instances of poverty that result from a loss of ability to work due to 
illness or natural or man-made disasters, the majority of instances of low income in 
developing countries are the result of the interaction of economic growth and income 
distribution. Obviously, if the increase in per capita income of an economy is so slow 
that it remains under the poverty line, most people will live in poverty no matter how 
equally income is distributed. The analysis of Dollar and Kraay (2000) using data from 
80 countries over about 40 years shows that ‘the income of the poor rises one-for-one 
with overall growth’. Similarly, if income disparity in an economy is increasing along 
with its per capita income, the problem of poverty will also worsen. Thus the 
combination of economic growth and improved income distribution is a basic and 
sustainable way for solving the problem of poverty. Therefore, it is imperative to find a 
mode of development that can promote economic growth and improve income 
distribution simultaneously. 
Economists have long strived for such an approach to development. Many suggestions 
have been put forward in different periods of history and in different contexts. However, 
economists have become less confident in making new suggestions. In a paper entitled 
‘Growth Strategy’ prepared for the Handbook of Economic Growth, Rodrik (2004) cites 
two paragraphs by Harberger, one in 1985 and another in 2003. The first highly praised 
the power of economic principles in influencing development policies, but the second 
one lost almost all confidence in the economic principles that it had previously praised. 
Rodrik ends his article as follows, ‘rule-of-thumb economics, which has long dominated 
thinking on growth policies, can be safely discarded’. This remark reflects the 
frustration of economists in facing the many problems of development in today’s world. 
We believe that the key to understanding the relationship between openness, growth and 
poverty is the government’s economic development strategy. According to Lin (2003), a 
country’s development strategy can be broadly divided into two mutually exclusive 
groups: (i) a comparative advantage-defying (CAD) strategy, which attempts to 
encourage the firms to deviate from the economy’s existing comparative advantages in 
their entry into an industry or choice of technology; and (ii) the comparative advantage-
following (CAF) strategy, which attempts to facilitate the firms’ entry into an industry 
or choice of technology according to the economy’s existing comparative advantages.12 
                                                 
11 This section draws heavily on Lin (2003). 
12 The concept of comparative advantage is most often used in trade theories. But the term we use here is 
not restricted to its conventional meaning. Even in a closed economy, an enterprise’s cost-minimizing 
input structure will be determined by the economy’s given factor endowment structure and market 
demand. If the relative intensity of the scarce resource used in the government’s prioritized industry 
exceeds its optimal cost-minimizing level, then the government’s development strategy is also a CAD 
strategy (Lin 2003).   9
When development economics started to take shape in the mid twentieth century, the 
dominant view among development economists w as to advise governments in the least 
developed countries (LDCs) to ignore their own comparative advantages and to adopt 
an inward-looking variant of the CAD strategy, telling them to focus on developing 
heavy-industry or import substitution. The endowment structure of most LDCs is 
characterized by a relative abundance of labour and lack of capital, whereas the projects 
supported by a CAD strategy are capital intensive and are not consistent with the 
comparative advantage of most LDCs. As a result, firms in government-selected priority 
sectors are not viable in an open and competitive market. Therefore, the governments 
must support these firms by intervening in the natural function of the market. Specific 
measures used include (but are not limited to) the following variants: interest rate 
suppression in order to lower investment and operation costs for heavy-industry 
projects, an overvalued domestic currency that makes importing equipment for heavy 
industry projects cheaper, and the creation of legal monopolies that allow firms to 
charge high prices in order to ensure high enough profits (Lin, Cai and Li 1996) 
Unlike many other developing countries, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan followed a development approach that was closer to a CAF strategy rather than 
a CAD strategy. After the Second World War, they upgraded their industries in 
accordance with the changes in their comparative advantages at each stage of 
development. They have achieved much better performance than their counterparts who 
adopted a CAD strategy. Lin (2003) argues that a country’s economic development 
strategy matters; and an economy’s growth, trade structure, income distribution and 
poverty are endogenous to its choice of development strategy. 
3.1  Development strategy and growth 
The most important sources of per capita income growth are per capita capital 
accumulation and technological progress. Capital accumulation depends on the size of 
economic surpluses and the rate of savings in the economy. When firms enter the 
industries in which an economy has comparative advantages and adopt cost-minimizing 
technology in their production, the firms will be competitive, the economy’s products 
will maximize their share in domestic and international markets, and the economy will 
maximize its possible surplus. Meanwhile, capital will have the highest possible rate of 
return when it is invested in industries in which the economy has comparative 
advantages. The incentive to save will also be maximized. Moreover, the government 
will not need to distort the prices of inputs and outputs, nor will it need to use 
administrative methods to create legal monopolies and provide subsidies in order to 
protect firms. Therefore, there will be no space for wasteful rent-seeking activities. The 
firms will have hard budget constraints and will need to earn profits by improving 
management practices and their competitiveness in the market. A CAD strategy will 
result in just the opposite effect with regard to competitiveness, the rate of return to 
capital, rent-seeking activities, and the softness of budget constraints for firms in   10
priority industries. Therefore, the accumulation of capital under a CAF strategy will be 
faster than under a CAD strategy. 
The accumulation of per capita capital will provide a basis for upgrading the 
industrial/technological structure of the economy (Basu and Weil 1998). Despite 
possibly being borrowed from developed countries (DCs), these upgraded 
industries/technologies will be new to the firms of an LDC. The learning costs will be 
lower under a CAF strategy because the distance between the new industry/technology 
and existing industry/technology is smaller (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1997). Moreover, 
the patent protections of many targeted technologies under a CAF strategy are likely to 
have expired; and even if they are still under patent protection, the licensing fee will be 
lower for technologies needed under the CAF strategy because ceteris paribus, most of 
the targeted technologies will be older than those needed under a CAD strategy. In some 
cases, firms under a CAD strategy will not be able to obtain necessary technology from 
DCs and will need to ‘reinvent the wheel’ on their own through investment in costly and 
risky R&D. Therefore, the acquisition cost of technology will be lower under a CAF 
strategy than under a CAD strategy.  
So by following CAF strategy, the speed of endowment structure (capital-labour ratio) 
upgrading and technological progress will be faster than under a CAD strategy. We 
have tested these hypotheses, using cross-country data and provincial data within China, 
and the results are consistent with the above predictions (Lin 2003; Lin and Liu 2003). 
3.2  Development strategy and openness 
A country adopting a CAF strategy will import products for which it does not have 
comparative advantages and export products for which it has comparative advantages. 
For this country, the degree of openness (the value of imports and exports as a 
percentage of GDP) is endogenous to the country’s comparative advantages.  
If the government of an LDC adopts a CAD strategy and attempts to substitute the 
importation of capital-intensive goods with domestic production, not only will the 
country’s import volume be reduced but its exports will also fall. The latter is the result 
of resources being redirected to priority industries from the industries in which the 
economy has a comparative advantage in addition to the exchange rate possibly being 
overvalued to facilitate the import of technology/equipment for the development of 
priority industries. Both will hamper the development of exports. The  economies that 
followed the model include the socialist countries, India, Latin American countries and 
many other developing countries. The performance of these countries had been 
miserable compared with the East Asian economies that adopted a CAF strategy. The 
government of an LDC may adopt a CAD strategy while at the same time encouraging 
firms in its priority sector capital-intensive  industries to export. In this case, even 
though a large proportion of the firms’ products may be sent to foreign markets and may 
see fast technological improvement, the products exported will not be profitable. These 
firms’ survival relies on government protection via preferential loans and other policy   11
supports. As a result of these policies, the country will have poor external accounts, 
accumulate massive foreign debt, and be sensitive to external shock.  
It may be better for an LDC to adopt a CAD strategy that encourages exports rather than 
a CAD strategy that encourages import substitution. However, the overall economic 
performance of a country that adopts a strategy encouraging exports will still be worse 
than that of a country that adopts a CAF strategy. Since the optimal level of openness of 
an economy is endogenously determined by its comparative advantages, it is not true 
that emphasis on external trade is a better policy for promoting economic growth in an 
LDC.  
3.3 Development  strategy,  income distribution and poverty  
To reduce poverty and distribute the income more equally, the economic situation of 
low-income groups has to be improved. Low-income individuals, unlike the wealthy, 
have little in the way of land, capital, higher education, personal relations or social 
networks that may help them generate income. The major source of income for the poor 
is the physical labour that they can provide. Therefore, to continuously increase the 
income of these individuals both absolutely and relatively, it is essential for creating 
employment opportunities and for increasing wages for them as much as possible. This 
is the only feasible and sustainable way to improve the economic situation of low-
income individuals in LDCs. If a CAF strategy is adopted and labour-intensive 
industries are developed, these people will have sufficient job opportunities. Moreover, 
the strategy will accelerate the accumulation of capital, which will in turn cause initially 
relatively abundant labour to become more and more scarce. In this process, industry 
and technology become increasingly capital intensive and the marginal productivity of 
labour increases, as do wages. With sufficient employment and an increase in wages, 
poverty can be eliminated. Meanwhile, as capital becomes increasingly abundant, the 
return to capital declines. The relative gap in income of people originally with an 
advantage in capital and those who could only depend on physical labour will be 
narrowed. Therefore, income will become more equally distributed. It is by adopting a 
CAF strategy that efficiency and equity can be achieved simultaneously in LDCs. 
On the contrary, if an LDC adopts a CAD strategy, and gives priorities to capital-
intensive industries, it will fail to create a large number of jobs. Most labourers will 
remain in the agricultural sector, where marginal productivity is low and their wages 
remain low (Lin et al. 1996). Meanwhile, only the rich and the powerful who have easy 
access to subsidized loans from banks will have the financial resources to invest in 
prioritized capital-intensive industries. However, firms in the priority industries will not 
be viable. Their investment and survival rely on government protection and subsidies, 
which must ultimately come from the pockets of the poor and powerless. Therefore, 
inequality in income distribution will be exacerbated.  
The CAD strategy will also reduce social transfers to groups in relatively weak 
positions such as the poor, jobless, disabled, and elderly. These groups are universally   12
acknowledged as the ones in need of social protection, either through social security 
networks or relief funds or through assistance from other family members. However, the 
resources that could be allocated to support these groups depend on overall economic 
growth. Under a CAD strategy, low economic performance reduces the total amount of 
resources that can be used to help these people. Sometimes, the government may even 
divert resources, which would have been allocated to the social security system, to 
subsidize prioritized sectors. This will lead to deterioration in the standard of living for 
disadvantaged people. 
4  Openness and poverty in China after reform 
Before reform started in 1978, China adopted a typical CAD strategy, which resulted in 
poor economic performance. Ever since reform started, China’s economic development 
has moved gradually toward that of a CAF strategy. 
The reform started with the replacement of collective farming with the household 
responsibility system in rural areas at the end of 1978. The institutional change greatly 
increased agricultural productivity (Lin 1992). Along with agricultural reform, the 
government also increased the autonomy of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and allowed 
them to share the profits through a profit retention system, later on a contract system and 
recently the modern corporation system. Meanwhile, township and village enterprises and 
other private enterprises began to emerge and grow. These new enterprises were faced 
with a hard budget constraint, as they were not entitled to government protection and 
subsidies, leaving them to fight for survival among fierce competition.  
The entry of new enterprises also increases the pressure on SOEs to face competition and 
forces them to improve performance. Since the mid-1990s, most small- and medium-size 
SOEs and collectively-owned enterprises have been privatized. With the progress of 
reform, the government reduced its direct interference on resource allocation and prices. 
Except for the financial market, most other markets have been liberalized. The reduction 
of the government’s interventions has shifted China’s development away from the CAD 
strategy to a CAF strategy.  
With the progress of reform and the change in development strategy, China has turned 
from being an inward-oriented economy to integrating more and more with the world 
economy. By establishing special economic zones, attracting foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and liberalizing trade, the link between the Chinese economy and the global 
economy has become closer, especially after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. 
China’s trade dependent ratio (the percentage of total imports and exports as a 
percentage of GDP) increased from 9.79 per cent in 1978 to 60.11 per cent in 2003 
(Table 1). Among the largest economies in the world, China has become the most open 
economy, as measured by the trade dependent ratio. At the same time, FDI in China 
increased from almost nothing in the early 1980s to US$53.5 billion in 2003, the largest 
recipient of FDI in the world that year. The share of FDI in China’s fixed asset   13
investment increased from 1.9 per cent in 1985 to 17 per cent in 1994 and remained at 
around 10 per cent from the late 1990s into the early 2000s (Table 2). The composition 
of China’s trade also experienced a big change, with a significant increase in the 
proportion of manufactured products in imports and exports (Figures 1 and 2). 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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Source: NSB  (China Statistical Yearbook, various years). 
 
However, integration with the world economy is not even throughout all the provinces 
and regions in China. As shown in Figures 3 to 5, the coastal provinces, especially 
Guangdong, received significantly more FDI and their imports and exports comprise a 
much higher proportion of their total value-added than provinces in the central and 
western regions.    16
Foreign enterprises in China have provided many jobs and account for a large portion of 
China’s imports and exports. At the same time, foreign enterprises have also contributed 
to China’s change in development strategy. Foreign enterprises face a hard budget 
constraint, and to minimize costs they must follow the comparative advantage in their 
chosen industry and technology. Moreover, by listing in the equity markets abroad or 
forming joint ventures, some large SOEs are able to gain access to foreign capital and 
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Source: NSB (China Statistic Yearbook, various years).   17
However, China’s transition to an economy totally observing the CAF strategy is far 
from complete. First, reform in some key areas is not finished. For instance, interest 
rates have not been liberalized; and the banking system still bears the burden of 
subsidizing large SOEs. Second, the degrees to which various regions deviated from 
their comparative advantage differed before reform, and their degrees of shifts to a CAF 
strategy also vary across regions. Third, after reform, all levels of government, 
especially local government, often use administrative measures (such as deliberately 
keeping land prices low, reducing local taxes, lowering environment protection 
standards, creating entry barriers for products produced in other provinces, etc.) to 
encourage firms to ignore the region’s specific comparative advantages in their choice of 
industries or technologies. Evidence from productivity differences between agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors clearly indicates that the change in China’s development 
strategy is still incomplete. 
Figure 6 

















































































Source: NSB (China Statistical Yearbook, various years). 
In an open, competitive market, the marginal return of a factor of production in various 
sectors will be equalized. Figure 6 shows that the agricultural sector’s labour productivity 
is increasing. If the differences of the agricultural sector’s labour productivity to those of 
manufacturing and other industries are narrowing, we can conclude that the marginal 
productivity gaps between agriculture and other industries are diminishing. Otherwise we 
can reach the opposite conclusion.13 Figure 7 shows the relative labour productivity of 
non-agricultural sectors to that of agriculture. We see that before the 1990s, the 
differences in productivity between agriculture and other sectors were decreasing; 
                                                 
13 The long-term trend of labour productivity is consistent with that of marginal productivity of labour.   18
however, from the first half of the 1990s, the differences have grown and for several 
sectors have exceeded those at the beginning of reform.14 
 
Figure 7 
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Source: NSB (China Statistical Yearbook, various years). 
 
Another proxy is the incremental output-labour ratio, the results of which are shown in 
Table 5.15 We see that after reform, the incremental output-labour ratios in the national 
economy, primary, secondary and tertiary industries all show an upward trend, 
especially in the first half of the 1990s and after 1999, a fact which indicates an increase 
in marginal labour productivity in all sectors. But compared with other industrial sectors 
and the national economy as a whole, the increase in the incremental output-labour ratio 
of primary industries is much slower. That is to say, the increase of marginal labour 
productivity in agricultural sectors is much lower than non-agricultural sectors. 
 
                                                 
14  It can be seen from Figure 7 that a large productivity gap exists not only between agriculture and other 
industries, but also among other non-agriculture industries. What specifically needs to be mentioned 
here is that relative productivity of the other tertiary industries is, in fact, underestimated because the 
value-added of tertiary industry is underestimated. 
15 The results in Table 5 are calculated with current prices.   19
Table 5 

















































































































































































1978–79  0.47 0.76 0.63  0.79 0.09 0.02  0.34  -0.49 
1979–80  0.36 0.21 0.56  0.55 0.67 0.29  0.99  -0.05 
1980–81 0.25 0.28 0.21  0.20 0.33 0.23  0.16  0.33 
1981–82  0.28 0.20 0.37  0.50 0.12 0.61  0.75  -0.67 
1982–83 0.56 0.68 0.79  1.11 0.36 0.34  0.49  0.21 
1983–84 0.70 -1.18  0.50 0.78  0.12  0.39 0.33 0.69 
1984–85 1.07 0.94 0.96  1.57 0.27 1.27  0.51  1.49 
1985–86 0.88 1.79 0.75  0.82 0.54 0.86  0.71  0.61 
1986–87 1.17 1.08 1.49  1.71 0.95 0.96  0.90  1.33 
1987–88 1.91 1.07 3.14  3.73 1.35 1.85  1.71  2.75 
1988–89 1.99 0.41  -3.93 -7.68 0.19 4.63 125.0  2.56 
1989–90  0.17 0.14 0.23  0.25 0.18 0.22  1.37  -0.57 
1990–91 4.14 1.48 8.71  9.38 5.57 3.54  7.03  4.68 
1991–92 7.60 -1.28  7.64 12.64 2.41 2.66 6.65 3.35 
1992–93 12.19 -1.06  7.75 19.48 2.11 2.05 36.57  1.31 
1993–94 18.74 -2.45  17.13 22.93 6.09 2.67 3.29 2.08 
1994–95 19.21 -2.31  17.98 25.98 5.90 2.21 2.84 1.75 
1995–96 10.63 -2.61  9.26 13.15 3.29 2.37 3.18 1.67 
1996–97 7.56 18.35  10.49 18.76 1.68 5.15  38.86  2.81 
1997–98 4.75 1.01  26.35 -3.28  1.20 5.01  -9.41 -4.83 
1998–99  4.92 -0.14  -10.83 -5.57 1.90 5.40  5.54  1.61 
1999-2000 10.71 0.57  -21.67 -12.09  3.32 4.64  -221.9 -3.89 
2000-01 8.35 1.67  58.69  -56.67  3.94 8.02  46.69  9.23 
2001-02 10.46 1.98 -9.51 -8.84  -18.94 2.30 5.30 1.13 
2002-03 17.50 -3.01  25.56     4.93     
Notes:    Negative figures (indicated in bold italics) refer to situations in which output increased but 
employ-ment decreased. These can be viewed as a very large positive number. The boxed 
negative figures  xxx refer to situations in which output decreased but employment increased, 
indicating that marginal labour productivity is very low. 
Source: NSB  (China Statistical Yearbook, various years). 
 
Of course, even in ideal conditions, labour productivity in different sectors cannot be 
exactly the same because of differences in technologies, transaction costs and other 
reasons. However, if the productivity gap between agriculture and other industries 
continues to increase, the difference in income distribution between the rural 
agricultural population and those in the urban sectors will become greater. As long as 
most of the poor rely on agriculture for their livelihood, poverty will not be eliminated. 
 
   20
Table 6 
Rural poverty in the provinces of China, 1985-2002 
Province  1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 
Beijing  0.00   0.09   2.91   0.60   0.00  
Tianjing  0.00   0.27   1.01   0.91   0.20  
Hebei  4.90   12.23   4.10   1.93   2.90  
Shanxi  4.10   15.52   9.80   6.74   5.00  
Inner Mongolia  10.60   12.46   10.60   8.21   9.80  
Liaoning  6.50   3.99   6.40   3.50   3.20  
Jilin  10.30   7.92   8.60   4.10   2.60  
Heilongjiang 14.10    12.98    8.21   5.59   3.40  
Shanghai  0.00   0.09   0.00   0.00   0.00  
Jiangsu  5.70   3.73   1.90   0.30   0.40  
Zhejiang  4.50   3.27   1.60   0.20   0.40  
Anhui  5.10   25.50   4.30   2.47   2.00  
Fujian  6.30   1.30   1.30   0.33   0.40  
Jiangxi  12.10   0.28   5.10   2.78   3.40  
Shandong  2.30   3.75   2.90   0.70   0.70  
Henna  24.90   20.02   7.60   2.97   1.70  
Hubei  3.70   8.15   6.10   2.21   2.00  
Hunan  12.60   2.82   7.61   2.29   1.90  
Guangdong  1.10   0.28   1.00   0.11   0.00  
Guangxi  22.20   6.42   10.50   5.00   2.70  
Hainan  7.07   0.00   7.40   1.90   3.00  
Sichuan  35.10   10.19   8.03   3.67   2.20  
Guizhou  36.80   21.38   20.51   10.80   10.70  
Yunnan  41.30   15.79   17.80   8.20   11.10  
Xizang  4.00   10.67   23.58   19.80   15.60  
Chongqing 35.10    0.00    11.24   4.24   3.00  
Shannxi  41.60   16.39   14.30   7.87   6.20  
Gansu  43.90   26.49   18.10   9.70   9.20  
Qinghai  5.00   16.32   16.10   18.60   16.10  
Ningxia  53.00   20.53   18.96   14.50   8.90  
Xinjiang 0.90    14.94    18.40   10.00   6.90  
Source:   NSB (various years). 
 
The evidence mentioned above has two implications for poverty reduction: First, there 
is a large potential for success in China’s future poverty reduction, especially in 
reducing poverty in rural areas. Contrary to Ravallion and Chen’s recommendation of 
reducing rural poverty by developing agriculture (2004), we advocate a new approach to 
rural poverty reduction. We suggest that China change its economic development 
strategy by increasing the proportion of labour-intensive industries and labour-intensity 
in various production sectors so as to create more non-agricultural job opportunities for 
rural workers. Thus, those staying in the agricultural sector will have access to more 
land and capital, which may contribute to a decrease in the productivity gap between 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. This may be one of the few feasible 
approaches to eliminating poverty in China in the near future.    21
Table 7 





Total population with 
income below the poverty 
line (1,000 people)  Poverty rate (%) 
Poverty rate (%) if 
poverty line is 
increased by 15% 
Beijing  3118 54  0.73    1.45 
Tianjing 2993  360  6.77    10.71 
Hebei 2509  651  5.20    9.15 
Shanxi 1616 596 7.17    11.07 
Inner Mongolia  1824  510  6.40   10.03 
Liaoning 2203 1150  6.13    11.63 
Jilin 1831  853  7.54    11.05 
Heilongjiang 1878  1154  6.92    11.54 
Shanghai 3636  314  3.24    4.98 
Jiangsu 2228 244  1.20    3.09 
Zhejiang 2989  153  1.62    3.06 
Anhui 2138  348  2.89    6.57 
Fujian 2416  145  2.18    4.24 
Jiangxi 1809 310 3.42    7.49 
Shandong 2566  1172  5.05    10.24 
Henna 1904  1410 8.39    12.97 
Hubei 2283  934  5.67    10.37 
Hunan 2146  462 3.61    7.37 
Guangdong 3061  154  0.68    1.07 
Guangxi 2507  246  3.01    7.53 
Hainan 2465 150 7.94    14.15 
Sichuan 2004  711  4.72    6.75 
Guizhou 2137  260  5.00    8.08 
Yunnan 2359 225  3.69    6.44 
Xizang 2237  39  11.31    13.99 
Chongqing 2214  260  4.09   6.99 
Shannxi 2014  932 11.95    17.66 
Gansu 1819  304 6.44    12.16 
Qinghai 1484  76  5.63    8.15 
Ningxia 2093 210  13.51    20.35 
Xinjiang 1772  383  6.16    7.04 
        
National 2310  14770  4.73    8.17 
Source: ADB  (2003). 
The second implication is that situations vary greatly between provinces and regions. 
The evidence cited above is not exactly the same for all provinces. Due to the different 
pace at which changes in development strategy are implemented, there are different 
degrees to which poverty reduction has been achieved. According to China’s official 
data, incidence rates of rural poverty vary greatly among different provinces (Table 6). 
Tibet, Qinghai, Guizhou, Yunnan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi and Anhui have relatively 
higher rates of poverty, while these values were relatively low for the big cities and the 
coastal provinces. One study on Chinese urban poverty conducted by ADB (2003) 
shows that incidence rates of urban poverty also vary greatly across provinces (Table 7).   22
In 1998, Guangdong had the lowest urban poverty rate, which was only 0.68 per cent, 
while Ningxia had the highest urban poverty incidence rate at 13.51 per cent.16 
5 Hypothesis  testing 
In this section we use provincial panel data to test the effect of openness and 
development strategy on the incidence of rural poverty in China. 
5.1  Proxies for openness and development strategy 
In order to assess the impacts of globalization and development strategy on the 
incidence of rural poverty in each province in China, we need to have proxies for 
openness and the development strategy. For openness, we use the export and import 
dependent ratio (EXIM), which is defined as the sum of provincial imports (excluding 
imports from other provinces) and provincial exports (excluding exports to other 
provinces) divided by the provincial value-added each year.  
Lin (2003) constructs a technological choice index (TCI) to measure the proxy for the 
development strategy. Given the endowment structure of a province, the nature of its 
development strategy is mainly characterized by all the capital-intensity as well as 
manufacturing industries of the province. When the province follows a CAF strategy, 
the optimum capital-labour ratio in manufacturing industries is endogenously 
determined by the province’s capital-labour ratio. That is, the optimum capital-labour 
ratio in manufacturing industries is a function of the economy’s capital-labour ratio, as 










⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
   (1) 
The left-hand side of equation (1) refers to the optimum capital-labour ratio in the 
manufacturing industry of the ith province at time t;  ,, it it KL  refers to the overall 
capital-labour ratio in the ith province at time t. In order to measure the deviation 
between the adopted development strategy and the CAF strategy in a province, a 
technological choice index (TCI) is constructed. It is the quotient between the actual 
capital-labour ratio in the manufacturing industry of a province and the endowed 
capital-labour ratio of the province , i.e. 
                                                 
16  Urban poverty lines are not the same in the various provinces. For instance, in Guangdong province, 












=  (2) 
Previous analysis shows that the provincial government’s development strategy will 
affect the value of the TCI in that province. 
We then define the optimal technology choice index, TCIi,t*, for the ith province at time 
t. From the first-order Taylor expansion of equation (1) at the origin and omitting the 
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 (3) 
where ω is a positive constant. The optimal technological choice index TCI* is defined, 














ω ==  (4) 
It should be pointed out that what we assume to be a positive constant, ω , is a 
province’s optimal technological choice index TCIi,t
*, rather than the optimal capital-
labour ratio of the province’s manufacturing industry (Ki,t/Li,t)
*. Indeed, when capital is 
relatively abundant in a province, the optimum capital-labour ratio in the manufacturing 
industry of the province will be higher than that in a province where capital is relatively 
scarce. In other words, the higher the capital-labour ratio in a province’s endowments 
(the denominator of TCIi,t
*), the higher the optimum capital-labour ratio in its 
manufacturing industry (the numerator of TCIi,t
*). To be more specific, what we assume 
to be a positive constant,ω , is TCIi,t
* rather than the numerate of TCIi,t
*. 
Given the definition of TCIi,t
*, a deviation from the CAF strategy in the ith province at 
time t can then be indirectly measured as follows: 
*
,, , , . it it it it DS TCI TCI TCI ω =− =−  (5) 
If a CAF strategy is adopted in the ith province at time t, DSi.t=0. When the actual TCIi,t 
is higher (lower) than optimal level, DSi,t>0(<0). The absolute value of DSi,t measures 
the deviation between the adopted strategy and the CAF strategy in the ith province at 
time t.  
                                                 
17 TCI
*is also affected by the level of economic development and the richness of natural resources in the 
economy. We will not address these issues in this paper.   24
There are two types of CAD, i.e. DSi,t>0 or DSi,t<0. According to our observations, all 
provincial governments in China have the intention to develop capital-intensive and 
technology-intensive projects that are inconsistent with the comparative advantages at 
their present stage of development, probably due to the legacy of development concepts 
inherited from the old strategy before reform. The characteristic of development 
strategies in China’s provinces is that of DSi,t>0. Given this fact, the deviation of 
adopted strategy from the CAF in the ith province at time t can be measured as:
 
DSi,t = TCIi,t –ω 
5.2  The specification of functional form 
In our empirical analysis, we hope to examine the effects of development strategies on 
openness and rural poverty. The econometric models are constructed as follows:  
,0 1 , . it it EXIM DS X αα υ =+ + + α
 (6) 
12 0 ,, , it it it PI DS EXIM Y ββ β ε =+ + ++ β  
(7)
 
In the above equations,  , it EXIM  refers to the trade dependent ratio of province i at time 
t, PIi,t refers to the incidence rate of rural poverty of province i at time t; α 0 and ß0 are 
constant;  DSi,t is the outcome of (5´), which represents the deviation from a CAF 
strategy in province i at time t. According to previous analysis, we expect that the larger 
the deviation, the lower the trade dependent ratio and the higher rural poverty incidence 
rate. This means α 1 is negative and ß 1 is positive. X and Y represent all other 
explanatory variables; α and β are the coefficient vectors. υ  and ε are the error terms. 
Since there is no observation for ω, DSi,t of (5´) cannot be calculated directly. However, 
since ω is assumed to be a positive constant, equations (6) and (7) can be transformed 
into (6´) and (7´):  
,0 1 , '. . it it EXIM TCI X αα υ =+ ++ α  (6´) 
12 0 ,, , ' it it it PI TCI EXIM Y ββ β ε =+ + + + β
 (7´) 
where  0 ' α  =α 0-α 1ω and  0 ' β  =β 0-β 1ω. The TCIi,t in (6´) and (7´) is the quotient of 
the actual capital-labour ratio in the manufacturing industry and the endowed capital-
labour ratio of province i in the year t.   25
5.3  Variables and data 
Provincial rural poverty incidence rates have been obtained from the National Statistics 
Bureau. The TCI index and other data used in the regression analyses are taken from 
Liu and Zhang (2005). TCIi,t is calculated through the following steps: (i) calculating the 
real capital (Ki,t) of the manufacturing industries of a province by devaluing the total 
value of fixed asset investments according to the fixed asset investment price index of 
that province; (ii) calculating the actual capital-labour ratio in the manufacturing 
industries, i.e. Ki,t/Li,t; (iii) based on the national accounting system for each province, 
calculating the capital stock( t i K , ) of all provinces using the perpetual-stock method; 
(iv) calculating the endowed capital-labour ratio, i.e.  t i t i L K , , / ; (v) TCIi,t is that of the 
actual capital-labour ratio in the manufacturing industries divided by this province’s 
one-year-legged endowed capital-labour ratio, i.e.,  ) / /( ) / ( 1 , 1 , , , − − t i t i t i t i L K L K .18 The 
dataset for TCIi,t is listed in the appendix. 
There are 31 provinces in mainland China, but as the data for Tibet and Hainan are 
incomplete, we have eliminated these two provinces from the regressions. Also, as 
Chongqing became a provincial-rank municipality only in 1997, we have combined the 
data for Chongqing and Sichuan after 1997 for comparability with past datasets. 
Therefore, we have data for 28 provinces from 1985 to 2002. 
Provincial rural poverty may also be affected by other variables. Other things being 
equal, the higher agriculture productivity is, the larger its contribution to the reduction 
of rural poverty will be. Therefore, we introduced a variable for agriculture productivity 
(AGR-PROD) to control for its effect on rural poverty. The variable is defined as 
agricultural value-added according to current prices divided by total rural 
employment.19 As the NSB revised its employment statistics from being based on local 
government reports to sampling surveys, there is considerable deviation in employment 
data before and after 1990. To ensure data comparability, we have restricted our use of 
                                                 
18 It is worthwhile to note that the capital endowment in each province is calculated from the fixed asset 
investments in each province’s manufacturing industries. Therefore, the measurement has already 
captured the effects of FDI and the cross-province capital flow on each province’s capital endowment. 
In addition, even though the movement of labour across provincial borders is easier today than in the 
past, there are still many hidden barriers. Therefore, we assume that the labour mobility does not 
significantly change the labour endowment of each province. 
19 Of course, we can use agricultural productivity calculated by constant prices. But our econometric 
analysis shows that productivities calculated at current price and constant price have similar behaviour 
in all the regressions. Another reason for us to use current price is that productivity in current price 
can reflect the impact of the price of agriculture products. Rural poverty incidence rate used as a 
dependent variable was also determined on the basis of poverty line adjusted by current price.   26
employment data to post-1990, which decreases the sample size for regressions 
including agriculture productivity as an explanatory variable from 420 to 196.  
Infrastructure, especially transportation, has a significant influence on rural poverty 
through labour mobility and agriculture-products market. thus indices of regional road 
density (ROAD) and railway density (RAILWAY) are introduced as well. 
The trade dependent ratio, EXIM, is endogenous to the development strategy of the 
government. In the estimation of its impact on rural poverty in equation (7´), we need to 
use the fitted value EXIM in equation (6´) in the regression of equation (7´) in order to 
obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients in equation (7´). The explanatory 
variables used in the regression of equation (6´) include TCI, AGR-PROD, ROAD, 
RAILWAY, and a COAST dummy to indicate whether the province is located in a 
coastal area. Coastal provinces are usually more open than inland provinces because of 
easier access to international markets. The dummy COAST is treated as an instrument 
variable in equation (6) in order to obtain the fitted value of EXIM for the second stage 
estimation of equation (7´).  
5.4 Econometric  results 
We used the cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression in Stata v8.0 to conduct 
estimation under assumption that the error structure across the panels is heteroscedastic 
but uncorrelated; and the form of autocorrelation is AR (1). The results for EXIM and 
PI are shown respectively in Tables 8 and 9. 
 
Table 8 
The effect of the development strategy on openness 












Number of obs  196 
Log likelihood               -748.8619 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 
Note:   *** indicates significance at 0.1 per cent level;  the numbers below each coefficient are standard 
errors.   27
The estimation results in Table 8 show that TCI has a negative and highly significant 
effect on EXIM. That is, as the previous sections suggest, the greater a province’s 
deviation from the CAF strategy, the less open that province will be. The results also 
show that AGR-PRO does not have a significant effect on EXIM, whereas the other 
three explanatory variables are all highly significant. However, the negative sign for the 
ROAD value is unexpected.  
Table 9 shows the results of fitting equation (7´) with a two-stage approach where 
EXIM in the second stage is the fitted value from the first stage regression as shown in 
Table 8. From the results, we can see that the development strategy followed in a 
province has a significant effect on rural poverty in that province. The greater the 
deviation from a CAF strategy in a province, the higher the incidence of rural poverty in 
that province will be.  
The estimation results of EXIM are negative and highly significant. That is, the more 
open a province, the less rural poverty there will be in that province. The negative effect 
of openness on rural poverty is likely to arise from the fact that most exports from China 
are labour-intensive manufactured goods. The increase in exports will increase demand 
for importing of intermediate inputs, while providing at the same time more job 
opportunities for rural migrants. As argued previously, the migration of the rural 
labourforce from the countryside to non-agricultural production is one of the most 
important ways to reduce rural poverty. 
Table 9 
The effect of the development strategy on rural poverty 
 I  II  III 
















AGR-PROD     -0.0366*** 
0.0097 
ROAD     -0.0914*** 
0.164 
RAILWAY     0.3499*** 
0.0540 
Number of obs  364  196  196 
Log  likelihood  883.6 527.7 301.4 
Prob > chi2  0.0011  0.0000  0.0000 
Notes:   EXIM is the fitted value from equation (6); 
  *  Indicates significance at 5% level; 
  **  Indicates significance at 1% level; 
  ***   Indicates significance at 0.1% level; 
    The numbers below each coefficient are the standard errors.   28
The results also show that the increase in agricultural productivity (AGR-PRO) will 
significantly reduce rural poverty in that particular province and an increase in its road 
density will have an effect similar to that of an increase in agricultural productivity. 
However, the effect of railroad density on the appearance of poverty in a province 
(RAILWAY) is puzzling. In model III, its coefficient is positive and highly significant. 
This question deserves further investigation. 
6 Concluding  remarks 
Even though China has achieved great success in poverty reduction since reform started 
in 1978, there is still a long way to go before the country can claim victory in the war 
against poverty. First, if the international standard for poverty of one dollar a day 
according to purchasing power parity is used instead of the domestic standard, the 
incidence of poverty in China, based on the estimations reported by ADB for 2000, will 
increase dramatically from less than 2 per cent in urban areas and 3.5 per cent in rural 
areas to 16.1 per cent, as shown in Table 10. Moreover, the pattern of poverty will 
change over time. It is expected that the severity of urban poverty and poverty among 
migrants from rural areas will increase in the future with the progress of 
industrialization and urbanization. 
Table 10 
Headcount index of Chinese poverty, (%) 
  National poverty line  1$(PPP) a day 
  Urban Rural   
2000   < 2.0  3.5  16.1 
Source:   ADB (2000).  
 
A more serious challenge is that while the Chinese economy achieves dynamic growth, 
income disparities are also increasing. This means that the distribution of benefits from 
economic growth is growing increasingly unequally. It will not only worsen the poverty 
problem but also slow down, or even block, the pace of solving extreme poverty. As we 
have pointed out above, the increasing productivity gap between agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors means that the dual nature of the Chinese economy is still a serious 
issue. 
It is obvious from the theoretical analysis in section 3 and empirical results in section 5 
that for poverty reduction in both urban and rural areas, one important and sustainable 
approach is to adopt a CAF development strategy and to promote the growth of labour-
intensive industries during China’s current stage of economic development. With this 
development strategy, the economy will grow dynamically, open to international trade, 
and will be able to reduce poverty. This is an important experience that China can 
provide to other developing countries.   29
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Appendix Table 
Dataset for the technological choice index (TCI), 1984-99 
Provinces 1984  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Beijing 2.9233  2.6197 2.2788 2.0686 1.8127 1.5738 1.4727 1.5499 1.6060 2.1215 1.5655 1.8659 1.6941 1.6602 1.8863 1.7084 
Tianjin 2.0554  1.9007 1.7694 1.7218 1.7334 1.7251 1.6290 1.6482 1.6859 1.4929 1.6680 1.8908 1.7359 1.8082 2.4158 2.4957 
Hebei 4.2771  3.3175 3.1557 3.1729 2.7331 3.1860 3.2930 3.6719 3.5402 3.3047 3.1246 2.8578 2.6911 2.5634 2.4950 2.4936 
Shanxi 3.5230  3.7246 3.2928 2.8583 2.5605 2.4858 2.6892 2.6657 2.5396 4.0745 3.5068 3.9725 3.9904 4.0484 4.3705 4.0576 
Inner Mongolia  6.0964  5.5199 4.7417 4.5526 4.2238 3.8756 4.1244 4.1717 3.8834 3.5234 3.5019 3.6616 3.5880 3.7228 4.6463 5.3463 
Liaoning 4.1518  3.5660 3.2696 2.9316 2.6367 2.6696 2.5989 2.4596 2.4203 2.2379 2.1899 2.4587 2.6529 2.7347 3.5608 3.9971 
Jilin 4.4789  4.0039 3.6249 3.6994 3.4045 3.0923 3.3966 3.7360 3.4757 3.6154 3.1261 3.3135 3.5348 3.6970 4.8241 5.0209 
Heilongjiang 4.0382  3.5971 2.9867 2.7587 2.5513 2.3188 2.3646 2.2386 2.1431 2.0747 1.9359 2.0023 2.0333 2.2129 3.0246 2.8291 
Shanghai 1.7720  1.5492 1.6088 1.4912 1.2952 1.1683 1.1510 1.2301 1.2642 1.2066 1.5825 1.3869 1.3041 1.3375 1.7169 1.7349 
Jiangsu 3.0187  2.4365 2.3924 2.0957 1.8480 2.0721 2.1463 2.3183 2.1264 1.7823 1.7039 1.8747 1.8758 1.9378 2.1138 2.1915 
Zhejiang 2.6047  2.6528 2.3732 2.1495 1.8273 1.9085 2.0444 2.0804 2.0453 1.8050 1.6543 1.7123 1.6197 1.6265 1.7505 1.7013 
Anhui 8.9673  5.9713 5.2317 4.5488 3.7602 4.0962 4.3593 2.9422 2.6488 2.7690 3.1870 3.2917 3.4339 3.5320 3.7922 4.1014 
Fujian 4.6001  3.7330 3.3514 2.9930 2.4262 2.4187 2.1877 2.0924 1.8812 1.9191 2.0757 2.4568 2.2745 2.2092 2.1183 2.0863 
Jiangxi 5.5994  4.1956 4.7257 3.5288 2.5992 4.0119 3.8089 3.7576 3.7061 3.6693 3.9245 4.2954 4.2652 4.1597 4.6064 4.4884 
Shandong 5.4818  3.6290 3.1805 2.9635 2.8114 2.9873 2.8166 2.6848 2.8155 3.2075 3.0970 3.1249 3.0136 3.5286 3.6292 3.4692 
Henan 6.7153  4.5765 4.3598 3.7267 4.1520 4.2924 4.0632 4.2318 4.1502 3.7448 3.6115 3.7931 3.6199 3.4957 3.8693 3.9945 
Hubei 6.5163  5.1297 4.5403 4.3889 3.9001 4.6918 4.1675 4.3696 4.1709 4.0572 3.6310 3.5334 3.4489 3.3062 3.8013 3.8084 
Hunan 7.7157  7.6332 4.0008 6.0198 5.4578 5.7110 3.8479 3.6199 3.7137 3.4933 3.5170 3.8642 3.7057 3.9054 4.0319 4.1232 
Guangdong 2.9197  2.4636 2.4504 2.4236 2.3076 2.5591 2.6282 3.3500 2.7349 2.8652 3.2138 2.9565 2.8298 2.8549 3.2599 3.0145 
Guangxi 7.8751  7.0936 6.2782 5.6637 3.7559 4.7666 4.6499 4.5802 4.3286 6.8514 5.8289 7.4256 7.1732 6.9178 6.9291 7.0563 
Guizhou 11.8961  9.2204 4.8355 5.5494 5.6977 5.1887 5.3582 5.2010 4.9324 5.1977 5.4170 5.4462 5.5529 5.4341 5.8933 6.0140 
Yunnan 5.9259  5.0976 5.1607 5.5636 5.5440 5.6084 6.7829 6.4728 6.2375 5.5120 5.3752 6.0250 6.0494 6.0527 6.3665 6.4052 
Shaanxi 6.6929  5.5195 5.9485 3.9648 3.9998 3.5117 3.1000 2.9693 3.2637 2.4638 2.5283 3.1672 3.1833 3.1534 3.7410 4.3313 
Gansu 10.7659  10.0962 8.9586 8.6226 7.4697 7.2679 6.7679 6.6970 7.0460 8.0497 8.4045  10.0032 9.9807 11.0896 12.6249 11.8209 
Qinghai 4.3398  3.5244 3.1782 4.2608 4.2425 5.2795 5.5843 4.5968 4.2157 4.4709 4.9769 5.5640 5.5155 7.0630 7.8109 10.3356 
Ningxia 3.7827  3.6426 3.5156 3.1614 2.7374 2.4670 2.5486 2.6143 2.8955 3.2178 3.1264 3.3287 3.2440 3.5906 4.4157 4.6909 
Xinjiang 4.9841  4.7845 4.1736 3.6316 3.3622 3.1868 4.1468 3.8556 3.6780 3.7459 3.1233 3.1453 3.4587 3.5053 4.0281 4.1671 
Chongqing&Sichuan 5.7334  4.2287 3.9741 3.7920 3.0882 2.9308 2.9194 3.0369 3.2218 3.3174 3.0734 3.4390 3.2440 3.5333 3.8864 4.2215 
Source:  Liu and Zhang (2005). 
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